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The Supreme Court’s decision in FTC v. Actavis, Inc.1 has 
justly received widespread attention for its antitrust analysis of 
settlements by which brand-name drug companies pay generics 
to delay entering the market. Much of the attention has focused 
on the application of the Court’s standard and the logistics of 
applying its rule of reason analysis to “reverse payment” 
settlements.2 
One overlooked issue, however, has been the position of 
Chief Justice Roberts in dissent that the antitrust analysis of 
these settlements must assume that the patent at issue is 
invalid or not infringed, since these inquiries present a problem 
of patent, not antitrust, law. 
This Essay critiques Roberts’ position. After presenting his 
argument, it explains that the dissent (1) presents an 
incomplete view of patent policy; (2) downplays the significance 
of antitrust law; and (3) ignores the Hatch-Waxman Act, 
Congress’s resolution of the patent-antitrust intersection in the 
pharmaceutical industry. 
I. ROBERTS’ ARGUMENT 
A central concern with reverse payment settlements is that 
a brand firm could pay a generic to delay entering the market 
even though its patent is invalid or not infringed. In this 
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scenario, the conduct resembles market division, with two 
competitors dividing the market and agreeing not to compete.3 
Roberts recognized in his dissent in Actavis that “[t]he 
problem” is that “we’re not quite certain if the patent is 
actually valid, or if the competitor is infringing it.”4 But he then 
swept these difficult issues under the patent rug by concluding 
that “that is always the case, and is plainly a question of patent 
law.”5 
Roberts stated that a patentee’s “behavior would be 
unlawful only if its patent were invalid or not infringed” and 
that “the scope of the patent—i.e., what rights are conferred by 
the patent—should be determined by reference to patent law.”6 
He continued: “While it is conceivable to set up a legal system 
where you assess the validity of patents or questions of 
infringement by bringing an antitrust suit, neither the majority 
nor the Government suggests that Congress has done so.”7 
Roberts combined his exclusive preference for patent law 
with the position that activity within the nominal scope of the 
patent is immune from the antitrust laws. A patentee “acting 
within the scope of its patent has an obvious defense to any 
antitrust suit: that its patent allows it to engage in conduct 
that would otherwise violate the antitrust laws.”8 
Continuing the argument, Roberts lamented that the 
majority “seems to have in mind a regime where courts ignore 
the patent, and simply conduct an antitrust analysis of the 
settlement without regard to the validity of the patent.”9 The 
problem is that “a patent holder acting within the scope of its 
patent does not engage in any unlawful anticompetitive 
behavior” but “simply exercis[es] the monopoly rights granted 
to it by the Government.”10 
Relatedly, Roberts worried about applying antitrust law in 
this setting, with the majority inappropriately 
“assess[ing] . . . patent law issues according to ‘antitrust 
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policies.’”11 Similarly, the majority “says that any questions 
regarding the legality of the settlement should be ‘measur[ed]’ 
by ‘procompetitive antitrust policies,’ rather than ‘patent law 
policy.’”12  
[A]lthough the question posed by this case is fundamentally a 
question of patent law—i.e., whether Solvay’s patent was valid and 
therefore permitted Solvay to pay competitors to honor the scope of 
its patent—the majority declares that such questions should 
henceforth be scrutinized by antitrust law’s unruly rule of reason.13 
Finally, Roberts responded to the majority’s suggestion 
that a right to settle “makes it harder to ‘eliminat[e] 
unwarranted patent grants.’”14 He recognized that “[t]hat may 
be so, but such a result—true of all patent settlements—is no 
reason to adjudicate questions of patent law under antitrust 
principles.”15 “[A]ntitrust law,” says Roberts, “has no business 
prying into a patent settlement so long as that settlement 
confers to the patent holder no monopoly power beyond what 
the patent itself conferred—unless, of course, the patent was 
invalid, but that again is a question of patent law, not antitrust 
law.”16 
II. CRITIQUE 
Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent is subject to several 
critiques. First, Roberts ignored the patent law policy of 
challenging and eliminating invalid patents. Second, he 
downplayed the role of antitrust law. And third, he neglected 
the importance of the Hatch-Waxman Act, Congress’s 
resolution of the patent-antitrust tradeoff in the 
pharmaceutical industry.17 
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 17. Roberts also mischaracterized the majority’s position when he 
lamented its use of antitrust “rather than” patent law to address reverse 
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A. PATENT POLICY 
Roberts claimed that the assessment of reverse payment 
settlements should be conducted solely pursuant to patent law. 
But even under this excessively constricted view, scrutiny is 
warranted. 
Patents are often viewed in absolute terms. They give a 
blanket right to exclude. They are presumed valid. Any 
incursion on their domain is inconsistent with the grant of the 
right. But these assertions do not present the whole story. 
Empirical studies have consistently shown that at least 
40% of patents issued by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) that are litigated to decision are invalid,18 with one 
FTC study finding that generics prevailed in 73% of challenges 
between 1992 and 2000.19 
These figures are not a surprise. The grant of a patent 
reflects an initial judgment by the USPTO that an invention is 
patentable. Such a judgment comes after limited scrutiny with 
examiners having, on average, less than twenty hours to read 
an application, search for prior art, evaluate patentability, and 
reach and write up conclusions.20 Because of this limited 
                                                          
 18. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the 
Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 194, 205 (1998) (finding that 
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 19. The study considered “Paragraph IV” certifications, by which generics 
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U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2012); see infra note 51 and accompanying text. 
FTC, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY   
9–10, 16 (2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/
genericdrugstudy.pdf. Portions of this and the next three paragraphs are 
adapted from Brief Amici Curiae of 118 Law, Economics, and Business 
Professors and the American Antitrust Institute in Support of Petitioners at 
15–17, FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2233 (2013) (No. 12-416), 2013 WL 
391001 [hereinafter Professor Brief]. 
 20. FTC, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF 
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 9–10 (2003), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf. 
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examination, litigation plays a crucial role in ensuring that 
invalid patents do not block competition.21 
The Actavis Court recognized the “patent-related policy of 
eliminating unwarranted patent grants so the public will not 
continually be required to pay tribute to would-be monopolists 
without need or justification.”22 The Court had recognized, 
more than four decades earlier in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, that a 
patent “simply represents a legal conclusion reached by the 
Patent Office . . . in an ex parte proceeding, without the aid of 
the arguments which could be advanced by parties interested 
in proving patent invalidity.”23 
Challenging invalid patents is even more important today 
than it was at the time the Court decided Lear. The burdens on 
the Patent Office have only increased, with the number of 
patent applications skyrocketing to over 500,000 per year, more 
than five times the number filed when Lear was decided.24 
In short, even an exclusive focus on patent policy must 
include the goal of testing (and eliminating) invalid patents 
through litigation. Roberts’ suggestion to decide the issue solely 
on grounds of patent law does not include this important aspect 
of patent policy. 
                                                          
 21. See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1495, 1531–32 (2001). 
 22. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2233 (2013) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 23. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969); see also Microsoft Corp. 
v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2253 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring) (offering 
measures designed to “increase the likelihood that discoveries or inventions 
will not receive legal protection where none is due”); MedImmune, Inc. v. 
Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 137 (2007) (finding that licensees have standing 
to challenge patent validity or infringement without repudiating their 
licenses); United States v. Glaxo Group, Ltd., 410 U.S. 52, 57 (1973) 
(emphasizing “public interest in free competition” in concluding that a licensee 
in an antitrust suit “may attack the validity of the patent under which he is 
licensed even though he has agreed not to do so in his license”); Blonder-
Tongue Labs. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 349–50 (1971) (allowing 
alleged infringer to claim estoppel where patent was previously declared 
invalid). 
 24. U.S. Patent Statistics Chart, Calendar Years 1963–2012, USPTO, 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm (last visited Aug. 
28, 2013) (showing 576,763 total patent applications filed in 2012, compared to 
104,357 in 1969). 
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B. ANTITRUST POLICY 
As the majority in Actavis recognized, reverse payment 
settlements have the “potential for genuine adverse effects on 
competition.”25 Of all the types of business activity subject to 
the antitrust laws, agreements by which competitors divide 
markets could be the most dangerous since “[m]arket division 
restricts all competition between the parties on all grounds.”26 
Reverse payment settlements result in generics dropping 
patent challenges and, in exchange for significant payments, 
agreeing to delay entry into the market.27 Because the brand 
makes more by keeping the generic out of the market than the 
two parties would receive by competing in the market, the 
parties have an incentive to cede the market to the brand firm 
and split the monopoly profits.28 The brand then can use a 
portion of this additional profit from delayed competition to pay 
the generic. 
Reverse payments allow brands to delay entry longer than 
they could based on the strength of the patent itself. An 
agreement concerning the generic entry date, without any cash 
payment, will normally reflect the odds of the parties’ success 
in patent litigation: the more likely the patentee is to win the 
case, the more it can rely on the patent itself to exclude 
competition.29 But by paying generics to stay out of the market, 
a brand is likely to gain additional exclusivity by 
supplementing this entry-date agreement with payment.30 The 
quid pro quo for the payment would appear to be the generic’s 
agreement to stay out of the market beyond the expected entry 
date resulting from litigation.31 As Justice Breyer explained: 
“The payment in effect amounts to a purchase by the patentee 
of the exclusive right to sell its product, a right it already 
claims but would lose if the patent litigation were to continue 
                                                          
 25. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2234 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 26. Professor Brief, supra note 19, at 11. Portions of this and the next two 
paragraphs are adapted from Professor Brief, supra note 19, at 11–12. 
 27. See id. at 11. 
 28. See Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements, 34 RAND J. 
ECON. 391, 407 (2003). 
 29. HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF 
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 15.3, at 
15-45 (2d ed. Supp. 2010). 
 30. Professor Brief, supra note 19, at 12. 
 31. Id. 
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and the patent were held invalid or not infringed by the generic 
product.”32 
Finally, market power likely exists where there are reverse 
payments. Again, as the Court understood: “[W]here a reverse 
payment threatens to work unjustified anticompetitive harm, 
the patentee likely possesses the power to bring that harm 
about in practice.”33 At a minimum, the “size of the payment” is 
“itself a strong indicator of power,” in other words, “the power 
to charge prices higher than the competitive level.”34 And a 
firm that lacks this power is not likely to pay “large sums” to 
induce “others to stay out of its market.”35 
Nor, finally, did the Supreme Court’s precedents bar 
antitrust liability in this setting. As Roberts recognized, the 
array of cases the Court decided in the early and middle part of 
the twentieth century addressed conduct lying outside the 
scope of the patent.36 But just because a settlement covering a 
product outside the scope of the patent violates the antitrust 
laws does not mean that one falling within the facial scope of 
the patent is automatically valid.37 And courts can reflexively 
conclude that the settlement falls within the scope of the 
patent only by making the inappropriate assumptions that the 
patent is valid and infringed.38 
In short, antitrust policy is relevant in determining the 
legality of agreements by which brand firms pay generics to 
delay entry. 
                                                          
 32. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2234 (2013). 
 33. Id. at 2236 (citing 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1503, at 392–93 (3d ed. 2012)). 
 34. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 12 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & 
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 2046, at 351 (3d ed. 2012)). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 2241 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“But each of those cases stands 
for the same, uncontroversial point: that when a patent holder acts outside the 
scope of its patent, it is no longer protected from antitrust scrutiny by the 
patent.”). 
 37. Michael A. Carrier, Why the “Scope of the Patent” Test Cannot Solve 
the Drug Patent Settlement Problem, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 5 (2012). 
 38. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2231–32; Carrier, supra note 37, at 5–6 
(explaining that the agreements “might or might not violate the antitrust 
laws,” but that “[t]hat depends on whether the patent is valid” and “cannot be 
determined by the mere existence of the patent”). 
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C. HATCH-WAXMAN ACT POLICIES 
As the Supreme Court has made clear, it is appropriate for 
courts applying antitrust law to “be attuned to the particular 
structure and circumstances of the industry at issue.”39 
Congress resolved the tension between the patent and antitrust 
laws in the pharmaceutical industry by enacting the Hatch-
Waxman Act (the Act).40 Any analysis of reverse payment 
settlements thus should at least consider the policies 
underlying the Act.41 
A central aspect of this complex regulatory regime was to 
encourage generic entry.42 At the time of the Act, generic firms 
needed to undertake lengthy, expensive trials to demonstrate 
safety and effectiveness even though they had the same active 
ingredients as brand drugs.43 Approval by the U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) took years, and because the 
required tests constituted infringement, generics could not 
even begin the process during the patent term.44 At the time 
Congress enacted Hatch-Waxman, there was no generic on the 
market for 150 brand-name drugs whose patents had already 
expired.45 The Act’s drafters lamented the “practical extension” 
of the patentee’s “monopoly position” beyond the expiration of 
the patent,46 and sought to “make available more low cost 
generic drugs.”47 
The first tool the legislature created to accelerate generic 
entry was the Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) 
process, which allowed generic firms to rely on the brand drug’s 
safety and effectiveness studies and avoid the expensive and 
lengthy new drug application process.48 Second, Congress 
                                                          
 39. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 
U.S. 398, 411 (2004). 
 40. Professor Brief, supra note 19, at 5; see Drug Price Competition and 
Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 
Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 28, and 35 
U.S.C.). 
 41. Portions of this and the next three paragraphs are adapted from 
Professor Brief, supra note 19, at 5–7, and Carrier, supra note 2, at 42–45. 
 42. See Carrier, supra note 2, at 41–42. 
 43. Id. at 42. 
 44. Id. 
 45. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 17 (1984). 
 46. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 4. 
 47. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14. 
 48. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A), (j)(8)(B) (2012). 
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resuscitated the experimental use defense, exempting from 
infringement the manufacture, use, or sale of a patented 
invention for uses “reasonably related to the development and 
submission of information” under a federal law regulating the 
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs.49 Third, Congress increased 
competition by creating a 180-day period of generic marketing 
exclusivity, reserved for the first generic to certify that the 
brand firm’s patent was invalid or not infringed and enter the 
market before the patent expired.50 The Act specified four 
avenues by which a generic could challenge a brand’s patent, 
but only the “Paragraph IV” route, which anticipates entry 
before the end of the patent term, received market 
exclusivity.51 
In addition to promoting generic competition, the Act 
included several mechanisms to bolster incentives for brand-
firm innovation. First, Congress increased the effective patent 
life by extending the patent term, with the extension currently 
amounting to half the time the drug is in clinical trials plus the 
period spent awaiting FDA approval after trials.52 Second, 
Congress granted an automatic thirty-month stay of FDA 
approval for generic products if patent holders sue generic 
filers within forty-five days.53 Finally, Congress provided for 
periods of market exclusivity not based on patents, such as the 
four-year exclusivity period for a drug with a new active 
ingredient.54 
Courts cannot effectively analyze reverse payment 
agreements without considering the Hatch-Waxman Act. The 
Act had a central purpose of encouraging challenges to invalid 
or not infringed patents during the term of the patent to 
encourage early market entry. Reverse payment settlements 
directly contravene this goal by allowing brands to pay generics 
for delayed market entry. Not only does such conduct flout the 
patent policy of testing invalid patents and present significant 
antitrust harm, but it also disregards the Hatch-Waxman Act 
and the important public policy goal of increasing the number 
of affordable generic medicines. 
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 52. 35 U.S.C. § 156(c) (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
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CONCLUSION 
Chief Justice Roberts contended that in determining the 
legality of reverse payment settlements, antitrust analysis 
must assume that the patents at issue are valid and infringed. 
But that position shortchanges patent law, which includes a 
policy goal of testing invalid patents to make sure they do not 
block competition. It downplays antitrust law’s role in 
monitoring behavior that can resemble market division 
between potential competitors. And it ignores the Hatch-
Waxman Act’s encouragement of challenges to patents that are 
invalid or not infringed. 
In a nutshell, the appropriate antitrust treatment of 
reverse payment settlements is more nuanced than the version 
presented by Roberts. 
